Endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly with one public firm, 1 n ( 1 ≥ ) domestic private firms and 2 n ( 1 ≥ ) foreign private firms, where the firms first choose the timing for choosing their quantities. We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities before quantity choice and find subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). The main result is that the public firm chooses to be a follower of all the domestic private firms and not to be a leader of all the foreign private firms, and that the number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private firms and of foreign private firms.
Introduction
Studies of mixed markets, in which welfare-maximizing public firms compete against profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in recent years. 1 Most of them consider a mixed oligopoly without foreign firms. But there are also some exceptions. For example, Fjell and Pal (1996) considered a mixed oligopoly model in which a state-owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms and discussed the effect of introduction of foreign private firms on the equilibrium price and allocation of production. Fjell and Heywood (2002) discussed a mixed oligopoly model in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. Matsumura (2003) investigated endogenous roles of firms in Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete by adopting the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) .
Alternate order of moves often produces significantly different results and thus whether firms move simultaneously or sequentially is very important. This is true for pure private oligopoly market and is also true for mixed oligopoly market. For example, Fjell and Heywood (2004) asserted that the result of irrelevance of privatization as long as government has access to tools of subsidization depends on the assumption of the assumed timing of moves after privatization and found that the privatization of a public firm in a mixed oligopoly will have important consequences when the public firm remains a leader after privatization. So endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly is a topic deserving much attention and of great importance.
Actually, in the literature there have been some papers discussing endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly. For example, Pal (1998) analyzed endogenous order of moves in a mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities.
2 Matsumura (2003) considered endogenous roles of firms in Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete.
However, there is no paper discussing endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with both domestic and foreign private firms. There are no foreign private firms in Pal (1998) and no domestic private firms in Matsumura (2003) . Endogenous role of firms in a mixed oligopoly with foreign private firms may be different from that in a mixed oligopoly without foreign private firms, and may also be different from that in a mixed oligopoly without domestic private firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill in this gap and to address the issue of endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with both domestic and foreign private firms. We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities before quantity choice. We find that in any equilibrium, the public firm chooses to be a follower of the domestic private firm and not to be a leader of all the foreign private firms, and that the number of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) depends on the number of domestic private firms and of foreign private firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. In section 3 and 4, we present the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3
The model
Consider a mixed oligopoly model with one public firm, 1 n ( 1 ≥ ) domestic private firms and 2 n ( 1 ≥ ) foreign private firms, all producing a single homogenous product. Assume that a is sufficiently large. All domestic and foreign private firms have constant and identical marginal costs of production, which are normalized to 0. The public firm also has constant marginal cost of production. However, it is assumed to be less efficient than the private firms. 3 Let 0 > c be the marginal cost of the public firm. For simplicity, fixed costs are zero for all firms.
Let
We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) Our objective is to solve the SPNE of this extended quantity setting mixed oligopoly game. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in which all the firms of the same type choose to produce in the same period. 
to that when all the firms produce simultaneously and the output of a foreign private firm is also identical. However, more output is now being produced by more efficient domestic private firms. So the public firm has incentive to deviate. If m =3, a private firm can increase its profit by producing in period 1 or 2.
5 Pal (1998) analyzed endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly without foreign private firms and demonstrated that all the firms choosing quantities simultaneously cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome (Proposition 3.1). Here, the same result holds true in a mixed oligopoly with foreign private firms.
Proposition 3.2. The public firm and all the domestic private firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. 
. If the public firm deviates to produce simultaneously with all the foreign private firms instead, then 0 * 0 = q , the total equilibrium output of the domestic private firms is
The total output is larger, the equilibrium price is smaller, the output of a foreign private firm is smaller, and more output is now being produced by more efficient domestic private firms. So the public firm has incentive to deviate. Similarly, if all the foreign private firms produce simultaneously as leaders and the public firm and all the domestic private firms produce simultaneously as followers, a domestic private firm can increase its profit by producing with all the foreign private firms simultaneously.
Comparing this proposition with Proposition 3.1 in Pal (1998), we find that the public firm and all the domestic private firms choosing quantities simultaneously cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome in the presence of foreign private firms in the market. 
. If the public firm produces in period 3 instead, then 0 * 0 = q , the total equilibrium output of the domestic
of foreign private firms is at least two ( ) 2 2 ≥ n and all the domestic and foreign private firms choose to produce in period 1.
Proof. With such an order of moves, we can easily show that a foreign private firm has incentive to deviate to produce in period 3 if 1 2 = n . And we can show that the public firm producing in period 2 cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome except in the case stipulated in the proposition.
Proposition 3.6. The public firm acting as a leader of all the foreign private firms cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. That is, in any SPNE, the public firm produces with all the foreign private firms simultaneously or as a follower of all the foreign private firms.
Proof. This follows form Proposition 3.4 and 3.5.
The result that the public firm chooses to produce with all the foreign private firms simultaneously or as a follower of all the foreign private firms in any SPNE is sharply different from the result in Matsumura (2003) that the public firm becomes the leader in the endogenous role game. 6 So we can see that the presence of domestic private firms has a great impact on the role of the public firm.
Proposition 3.7. There are 6 SPNE when 1 1 = n and 1 2 = n , that is, when there are only one domestic private firm and one foreign private firm in the market. In equilibrium, the public firm chooses to produce in period 3, all the domestic private firms choose to produce in period 1 or 2, and all the foreign private firms produce in period 1, 2 or 3.
Proof. We can easily check that no firm has incentive to deviate. Firstly, note that the public firm chooses to produce in period 3 when 1 2 = n . Secondly, the domestic private firm has no incentive to deviate since it is a leader of the public firm and cannot increase its output because there is only one domestic private firm. Thirdly, note that the first order condition of the public firm's domestic social welfare maximization problem:
. If the foreign private firm produces in period 1 or 2, then its profit-maximization output is 2 1 c q f = . Meanwhile, when the foreign private firm produces in period 3, the outcome is also the same. Hence, the foreign private firm does not care about in which period to produce. Proposition 3.8. There are 3 SPNE when 1 1 = n and 2 2 ≥ n , that is, when there are only one domestic private firm and at least two foreign private firms in the market. In any equilibrium, all the foreign private firms produce in period 1. In one equilibrium, all the domestic private firms produce in period 1, and the public firm produces in period 2. In the second equilibrium, all the domestic private firms produce in period 1, and the public firm produces in period 3. In the third equilibrium, all the domestic private firms produce in period 2, and the public firm produces in period 3.
Proof. We can easily check that no firm has incentive to deviate. Firstly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. Secondly, the domestic private firm has no incentive to deviate since it is a leader of the public firm and cannot increase its output because there is only one domestic private firm. Thirdly, note that the first order condition of the public firm's domestic social welfare maximization problem: 0 ) (
. No foreign private firm has incentive to deviate because its output decreases if it deviates.
Proposition 3.9. There are 3 SPNE when 2 1 ≥ n and 1 2 = n , that is, when there are at least two domestic private firms and only one foreign private firm in the market. All the domestic private firms produce in period 1, the public firm produces in period 3, and all the foreign private firms produce in period 1, 2 or 3.
Proof. We can easily check that no firm has incentive to deviate. Firstly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. Secondly, all the domestic private firms has no incentive to deviate since they want to produce more in period 1 and cannot increase its output.
Thirdly, the only foreign private firm has no incentive to deviate for the same reason as in the proof of Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 3.10. There are 2 SPNE when 2 1 ≥ n and 2 2 ≥ n , that is, when there are at least two domestic private firms and at least two foreign private firms in the market. All the domestic and foreign private firms produce in period 1, and the public firm produces in period 2 or 3.
Proof. We can easily check that no firm has incentive to deviate. Firstly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. Secondly, all the domestic and foreign private firms have no incentive to deviate since they want to produce more in period 1 and cannot increase its output.
Proposition 3.11. The number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private firms and of foreign private firms.
Proof. This follows form Proposition 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.
Main Results for more than three periods (
, there are the following SPNE:
(1) When 1 1 = n and 1 2 = n , the public firm produces in the last period, the domestic private firm produces in any period except the last period, and the foreign private firm produces in any period;
(2) When 1 1 = n and 2 2 ≥ n , all the foreign private firms produce in period 1, the domestic private firm produces in any period except the last period, and the public firm produces in any subsequent period after the period in which the domestic private firm produces;
(3) When 2 1 ≥ n and 1 2 = n , all the domestic private firms produce in period 1 and the public firm produces in the last period, and the foreign private firm produces in any period;
(4) When 2 1 ≥ n and 2 2 ≥ n , all the domestic and foreign private firms produce in period 1, and the public firm produces in any subsequent period.
Proof. We need to note that a foreign private firm has incentive to deviate to be a follower of the public firm if 1 2 = n . So the public firm must produce in the last period when 1 2 = n . We also need to note that a domestic (foreign) private firm has incentive to produce in period 1 if there are at least two domestic (foreign) private firms. Therefore, all the domestic (foreign) private firms must produce in period 1 if
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with one public firm, 1 n ( 1 ≥ ) domestic private firms and 2 n ( 1 ≥ ) foreign private firms by considering the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities before quantity choice. We find that in any equilibrium, the public firm chooses to be a follower of the domestic private firm, and that the number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private firms and of foreign private firms.
The results of this paper question the exogenous timing in the research of a mixed oligopoly with both domestic and foreign private firms. If the firms could choose the timing of their quantity choices, the timing should be endogenous. The contribution of this paper is to extend Pal (1998) by introducing foreign private firms into a mixed oligopoly.
Appendix: Some Selected Calculations
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
(1) If all the firms produce simultaneously in period m (=1, 2, 3), then every firm's payoff maximization problems give us the following first-order conditions: 
Solving these simultaneous equations, we get the equilibrium outcome: We can easily check that the public firm has incentive to deviate to produce in period 3 rather than produce simultaneously with all the private firms in period m (=1 or 2). 
We can easily check that domestic private firm 1 has incentive to deviate to produce in period m (=1 or 2) rather than produce simultaneously with all the private firms in period 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
(1) If the public firm and all the domestic private firms produce simultaneously as leaders and all the foreign private firms produce simultaneously as followers, then from (A.3),
we can obtain a foreign private firm's reaction function, ) 1 /( ) ( cq na n na n na n a 
If the public firm deviates to produce simultaneously with all the foreign private firms We can easily check that the public firm has incentive to deviate to produce simultaneously with all the foreign private firms as a follower of all the domestic private firms rather than produce simultaneously with all the domestic private firms. cq n n q a n n n q a n n n n q a n n a − + + − − + + + + − + + + + .
We can easily get the public firm's welfare maximization output, 
